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## Voting Patterns of Hispanics in Texas, 1960-1986

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**VOTING PATTERNS OF HISPANICS IN TEXAS**  
**1960 - 1986**

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A Thesis  
Presented to  
The Faculty of the Department of Sociology  
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment  
Of the Requirements for the Degree of  
Master of Arts

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by  
Rebecca Allen Rogers  
1989

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APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of  
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

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Approved, May 1989

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## DEDICATION

In memory of my parents, especially my mother who wanted a daughter to attend the College of William and Mary.

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## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to compare the voting patterns of Hispanics in Texas over the course of several elections and examine whether there has been an increase in the number of Hispanics voting for Republican candidates.

A purposive sample of proportionally low and high Hispanic counties was used to draw a comparison of results of recent elections in Texas. Texas was selected because of the large number of counties in the state and the high percentage of Hispanic Americans found within its borders. The Hispanic population of Texas is composed primarily of Mexican Americans -- one of five major subgroups. By concentrating the study on one Hispanic subgroup, the cultural and political differences existing among other subgroups was eliminated.

Secondary data sources were used to analyze recent elections to see if a pattern emerged which would indicate a shift in voting by Hispanics for the Republican party. No pattern was found to exist. An increase in Hispanics voting for Republican candidates was found, but there was no substantial difference from the increase occurring throughout the entire state.

The results suggest that Hispanics are showing a willingness to listen to the Republican party which has extended a greater effort on attempting to gain their vote. However no realignment or increase in Republican identification among Hispanics is occurring currently.

**VOTING PATTERNS OF HISPANICS IN TEXAS**  
**1960 - 1984**

## INTRODUCTION

Recent studies estimate the United States Hispanic population as growing five times faster than that of the general population. With estimates projecting Hispanics to be the second largest minority in 1990, one out of every fourteen Americans is now of some Spanish background.

The rapid increase in the number of Hispanic Americans is making this minority group a potential strong voting block in future elections if they join together to form a coalition. Past research indicates that if captured early, these groups will remain loyal to the national political party for several generations. (See V.O. Key's study of Irish immigrants.) Hispanics were called the "sleeping giant" by the "Christian Science Monitor" because of their possible influence in future elections. (Sullivan, 1986)

The following analysis reviews Hispanic voting patterns over the course of several elections in Texas and examines whether there has been an increase in the number of Hispanics voting for Republican candidates. Texas was selected as the system state due to the high percentage of Hispanic Americans found within its boundaries as well as the range of percentages of Hispanics found among Texas counties. Texas provides fifteen counties with 70 percent

or more Hispanic population and twenty-five counties with less than 5 percent Hispanics. This wide range helped reduce the number of errors that can occur in "inferring individual behavior from categorical associations". (Rogers and Rhyne, 1987) Texas was also selected because the Hispanic population of Texas is primarily composed of Mexican Americans -- one of five major subgroups. By concentrating the study on one Hispanic subgroup, the cultural and political differences that exist among those coming from Mexico, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Central America and other Spanish speaking countries were eliminated.

A purposive sample of proportionally low and high Hispanic counties in Texas was used to draw a comparison of the results of recent presidential elections (1976, 1980, 1984). A comparison of the voting patterns in the twenty-seven congressional districts in Texas was done for congressional elections from 1974 to 1986. Also, congressional districts that have a high or low percentage of Hispanic population were analyzed by county to see if a pattern emerged indicating a shift in voting by Hispanics for the Republican party. Lastly, presidential election returns in the twenty most populous counties in Texas were examined for trends.

The unit of analysis for this study was Hispanic voters in Texas. The term "Hispanic voters" includes the subgroups of Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, Cuban Americans and Central and South Americans/Other Spanish Origin. As

previously noted, the Hispanic population of Texas is composed primarily of Mexican Americans. Cubans and Puerto Ricans have not settled in Texas, but have opted for northern areas of the country. Results from the 1960, 1974, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, and 1986 elections were compiled. Presidential and congressional general election results were analyzed.

Data was gathered through the use of secondary data sources which consist of census data (1980, 1985 estimated), presidential and congressional election returns from the years 1960 - 1986, media exit polls, Midwest and Southwest Voter Registration Project Survey returns, Republican Almanac analyses, The Hispanic Almanac, Republican National Committee election data, the 1986 State and Metropolitan Area Data book, as well as standard demographic data.

Through the use of maps and tables, a comparison of results from previous elections was done and used to track past Hispanic voting patterns.

The primary questions under investigation were:

- (1) Within the Hispanic community, is a shift occurring of more Hispanics voting for the Republican candidate?
- (2) Are Hispanics shifting their party identification/allegiance to the Republican Party?

President Reagan received 47 percent of the Hispanic vote in the 1984 Presidential election according to the Republican National Committee (RNC). This was based on several media exit polls. The rising number of Hispanic

voters was recognized by the GOP in 1984 and they initiated a program in 1986 which tried to reach out to the Hispanic community in an attempt to gain their support in the 1986 election as well as future elections. In reviewing previous election data, the Republicans found that Richard M. Nixon (R) lost the 1960 Presidential contest to John F. Kennedy (D) primarily due to then Senator Kennedy capturing the Hispanic vote in Texas. The Republican Party has fought an uphill battle since 1960, and has tried to gain the allegiance of Hispanic voters. Currently, only 10 percent of Hispanic Americans identify themselves as Republican. This paper was an attempt to see if the Republican Party was indeed gaining Hispanic voters, at least in the state of Texas, and to interpret the underlying reasons for such a shift if it was occurring.

The results of this analysis can only be applied to the state of Texas. To say that what has occurred in Texas is indicative of the other eight "Hispanic" states would be misleading. The analysis here is an attempt to bring light to a topic I believe will receive greater attention in the future. I assert that the growing Hispanic population will prove to be a strong force in future elections with candidates courting their vote in coming years.



## CHAPTER I

### THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The effect of voting blocs or coalitions has long been noted in the electoral process. In *The People's Choice*, Lazarsfeld discussed the variables surrounding the selection of a particular candidate by a voter. Although dated (1948), this classic is still used by contemporary researchers in their work surrounding the process of voting. Lazarsfeld showed how status and class categories were correlated positively with the tendency to vote for a particular party.

The formation of political machines such as Tammany Hall capitalized on the appeal of a particular issue to a specific voting group. The promise of jobs to Irish immigrants in Chicago is an example. These politicians unknowingly introduced a rough form of present day "targeting". They directed a specific appeal to a particular group. By emphasizing unique characteristics (i.e. Irish background), politicians solidified their re-election or election to office.

So successful was this coalition in the 1930's and 1940's and then again in the 1960's that Democratic strategists increasingly began to think that the

coalition was simply a matter of devising specific appeals and programs for each of the major groups and then adding them up as a great majority. (Rhyne,1986,4)

The Democratic party has historically appealed to ethnic minorities and immigrants. It is unknown whether this trend will continue in future years. Hispanics, as well as other minority groups, have become less committed to the Democratic Party in recent years because they feel their vote has been taken for granted. One disenchanted Hispanic voter commented, " 'They [Democrats] just dust off the same speeches they gave in the '60's, without developing any new rhetoric, any new programs, or any new ideas' ". (Sullivan, 1986,4) This disenchantment is what I believe will shift Hispanic and possibly other immigrant groups from the Democratic to the Republican party.

Rhyne noted two conditions necessary for using an explicit status group appeal strategy in trying to achieve a campaign victory. First, the status group appeal needed to be large. If there were several groups, their membership needed to overlap. (Rhyne,1986) Lazarsfeld first developed this idea, terming it cross-pressuring. This phenomenon made the voter unpredictable and possibly prevented voting from occurring at all. (Lazarsfeld,1948)

Dahrendorf (1959) discussed this same problem, labeling it superimposition. His theory was different from Lazarsfeld, but advanced the same basic idea. Problems arose when conflicting appeals were made to the voter. As

Rhyne noted, "In Dahrendorf's terms, if superimposition intensifies conflict, the lack of it, especially when the multiple memberships are contrasting; leads to withdrawal and apathy." (Rhyne,5) If a person fell into three categories, or three "multiple statuses", that are not superimposed, the voter became cross-pressured. Rather than entering the groups of "undecided" and "unpredictable/swing" voters, these potential voters move into the category of not voting.

This theory is applicable to Hispanic voters who historically have a low voter turnout rate. The Republicans for the most part, have made campaign appeals to traditional values such as law and order, respect for the family, and other values held in high regard by Hispanics. Catholicism which stresses traditional and family values, is the predominant religion of Hispanics. Catholics have traditionally identified with the Democratic party, but former President Reagan's strong stance on the right to life issue drew many Catholic voters into the Republican party. Berelson noted:

(N)ational party leaders have been Catholics, particularly the chairmen of the Democratic National Committee over the last twenty-five years. In addition, there is a long-term connection between the party and the church stemming from the great immigration waves of the nineteenth century...(A) condition is found which is not anticipated nor endorsed by classical political theorists: a nonpolitical, associative factor with strong influence upon the electoral decision. Regardless of other demographic characteristics -- and despite democratic

claims -- there is a strong "religious vote" in this country. (Berelson, 1954, 66)

The second condition Rhyne discussed was the strategy of inclusiveness as opposed to exclusiveness. Rhyne noted the strategy taken by Roosevelt in the New Deal when he appealed to the "common man" and "forgotten Americans". "The value of such appeals is that many a status category could read themselves into such appeals regardless of who else might be doing the same." (Rhyne, 5) Ronald Reagan capitalized on this strategy. The 1980 and 1984 campaign themes of the GOP centered around "Bringing America Back" (1980) and "America is Back: Stronger, Prouder, and Better" (1984). This was something that every individual American could identify with -- it was not exclusive, but rather inclusive. The GOP idea was to try to bring everyone into the party rather than continuing their reputation as elitist.

Explicit campaign appeals to specific status groups -- appeal reference to a class, a race, a religious group, etc. -- are potentially dangerous for a political candidate. When the appeals are to groups that are less numerous than those excluded, the potential danger is usually fatal. That is, when a candidate, in attempting to 'turn on' one or more groups, succeeds in thereby 'turning off' the excluded or opposite groups, defeat looms as a near certainty when the latter outnumber the former. (Rhyne, 5)

The Republicans made a direct appeal to the average American voter -- be proud that you are an American. The

promises made in the Republican platform ensured a strong and proud America. Continued American dominance in the international arena, tax relief and a bigger, better defense to protect against the spread of communism were promised to every individual. Traditional values were appealed to with the hope of drawing the support of ethnic groups (Hispanics). (Sullivan,1986;Mintz,1984;Alderman,1984) The Democrats who continued their strategy of separate appeals found themselves continually falling behind in election polls. In the 1984 Presidential election, the Democratic Party captured only one state (Minnesota) and the District of Columbia and found their "exclusiveness" appeal was not working.

With their ever-growing array of distinct caucuses (black, female, Hispanic, etc.) and with a nominee born and bred to this practice, the Democratic campaign was less a single campaign than it was many separate ones, each saying to a separate group, 'We are as one with you, your beliefs, and your cause.' No doubt the targeted group was flattered, but as the number of such appeals increased so did the pool of people who would feel excluded if not offended. (Rhyne,5)

## CHAPTER II

### HISPANICS AS A VOTING GROUP: AN OVERVIEW

Eighty-five percent of all voting age Hispanics are found in nine states -- New York, Illinois, New Mexico, California, Arizona, Florida, Texas, Colorado and New Jersey. These nine states control a total of one hundred ninety three electoral votes -- 71 percent of the two hundred seventy votes needed to win the Presidency. (Republican National Committee, 1986)


The Hispanic community has increasingly shown signs of being willing to listen, as well as vote, for Republican candidates since the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. The increased number of Hispanic Republicans in elected office and Reagan's 1984 sweep of forty-nine states give credence to this statement. In 1984, President Reagan received 47 percent of the Hispanic vote according to exit polls, up from 30 percent in 1980. (Republican National Committee, 1986) Other Republicans who received a large percentage of the Hispanic vote include Representative Bob Dornan (R-CA) in District 38 who won with 47.2 percent of the Hispanic community's vote, Governor George Deukmejian (R-CA) received 27 percent of the Hispanic community vote and Senator Pete Wilson (R-CA) who received 25 percent in 1982.

In some areas of the country, the Hispanic population may be more than 75 percent of the district, thus an excellent group for political campaign targeting. An attempt to target Hispanics as a voter group must take several things into consideration. Although united by a common language, Hispanics as a subgroup differ in regard to their "geography, country of origin, race, class, traditional differences and the time and circumstances of their entry." (Hispanic Almanac, 1984, 16) These factors are a necessary influence in targeting and are usually the guiding force behind the casted vote.

Hispanics can be broken down into four subgroups: Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, Cuban Americans, Central and South Americans/"Other Hispanics". Although all consider Spanish their native language, they differ on areas of major concern. For instance, Puerto Ricans are not that concerned about Castro and Cubans are not really interested in the political status of Puerto Ricans.

One of the four subgroups is Mexican Americans. This is the subgroup that I chose to focus on due to their high concentration within the state of Texas (See Map 1). Because of the proximity of the Mexican-American border, Texas as well as the southwestern states of New Mexico, Arizona and California have seen a significant influx in the Mexican American population over the past thirty years. Comprising 60 percent of the Hispanic population in the United States in the 1980 census, estimates in 1985 set the

MAP 1  
 PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION OF SPANISH ORIGIN  
 1980





Mexican American population at 10.3 million. It is hard to place an exact figure on the number of Mexican Americans found in Texas due to the transient nature of Mexican agricultural workers who go back and forth across the border with some frequency, but they are believed to comprise 60 percent of the Hispanic population in Texas.

Few Puerto Ricans live in Texas. The highest concentration of Puerto Ricans living in the United States is found in New York. Originally they migrated to New York City, but they have since moved to the metropolitan areas surrounding New York, mainly New Jersey and Connecticut. Puerto Ricans are considered United States citizens from birth and thus are free to migrate here. Migration of Puerto Ricans peaked in the 1950's and has steadily declined since. In 1980, Puerto Ricans accounted for 15 percent of the total Hispanic population in the United States, with 2.6 million people estimated to be of Puerto Rican origin in 1985.

The third group, Cuban Americans, can be broken down into two subgroups: those who migrated to the United States within the last twenty years (refugees) and those entrants of the 1980 Mariel flotilla. (Hispanic Almanac, 1984) Cuban Americans are concentrated in Florida due primarily to Cuba being about fifty miles off the coast of Florida. Originally concentrated around Miami, Florida, Cubans have spread to several other states, with some Cuban Americans found in Texas. (Republican National Committee, 1986)

The final group, Central and South Americans, are Hispanics who, whether fleeing from political adversity or drawn by economic advantage, have migrated from Latin American countries in large numbers over the past decade. (Republican National Committee, 1986) The highest concentrations are found in New York and California with few found in Texas.

Known as the "sleeping giants" of the national political scene, Hispanics have tripled their population in three decades, exceeding the growth of any other ethnic minority in the U.S. In March, 1985, there were 16.9 million persons of Spanish origin in the U.S. according to census estimates. The 1980 census figure was 14.6 million, representing an increase of 16 percent (2.3 million persons) in five years. High fertility rates, large natural increases and continued immigration were found to be the main contributing factors in this growth. These trends are projected to continue, making Hispanics an ideal group for current and future political targeting.

A 2.6 percentage point increase was found in the VAP, Voting Age Population (eighteen years and older), from 1980 to 1985 (1980:61.4 percent; 1985:64.0 percent). Thus, a growth in the VAP of Hispanics nationally can be seen and presumed to be continuing given the projected rates of population growth for this group. This projected growth in VAP gives strength to the idea of political targeting.

Tables 1 and 2 give a demographic breakdown of Hispanic subgroups. This type of data is important to national parties who intend to measure and capture the Hispanic vote. It also permits direct targeting and specific issue appeal to separate Hispanic subgroups. The following section looks at the idea of voter targeting specifically within the Republican party, and its application to the Mexican American subgroup found in Texas.

### CHAPTER III

#### REPUBLICAN EFFORTS TO TARGET HISPANIC VOTERS

Realizing that Hispanics were to play a key role in future elections, the GOP incorporated messages into their 1984 Republican Presidential platform directed specifically at Hispanics. Stressing traditional values, this message was incorporated into the platform:

The healthy mix of America's ethnic, cultural, and social heritage has always been the backbone of our nation and its progress throughout our history. Without the contributions of innumerable ethnic and cultural groups, our country would not be where it is today. For millions of Hispanic Americans the past four years have seen a dramatic improvement in their ability to secure for themselves a better tomorrow. (Republican National Committee Platform, 1984,19)

History has shown that "off year" elections (non-presidential) have predominantly lower voter turnouts. (Lazarsfeld,1948) Research and history have also shown that the party occupying the White House during this time will lose seats in congressional races.

In 1986, the Republicans had control of the White House with Ronald Reagan as President. In an effort to decrease the anticipated losses of the 1986 congressional elections,

the GOP initiated "Achievement '86" which was designed to target various specific voter groups, register them, and then turn out their vote on election day. Hispanics were one of the targeted voter groups selected by the GOP.

Hispanics were selected by the Republican party for political targeting for a number of reasons. First and foremost, Hispanics had a large population base which was also growing at the fastest rate in the country. Secondly, research found the majority of Hispanics were not registered to vote. Internal Republican National Committee reports showed that although Hispanics identified with the Democratic party, their values and beliefs were in line with the Republican party. Marketing Opinion Research (MOR) and Decision/Making/ Incorporated (D/M/I), pollsters retained by the Republican National Committee, found that as many voters identified themselves as Republicans as they did Democrats (polls conducted in January, November 1984). A New York Times/CBS poll in November, 1984 found similar evidence with 47 percent of the Hispanic respondents reporting GOP identification and 44 percent identifying with the Democrats. (Republican National Committee, 1986) Four coalitions built by the Republican party in 1984 were cited by Republican National Committee reports as contributing to these strong polling numbers; Hispanics were one. (Republican National Committee, 1986) These figures made Hispanics a likely choice for political targeting.

The Republicans had also made gains on the national front with the Hispanic community. Linda Chavez, a Hispanic, had held a high level White House position, Assistant to the President for Public Liaison. Ms. Chavez eventually stepped down from her White House position to run for a Senate seat vacated by Senator McC. Mathias in Maryland (R) who retired. The Republicans were the first to place a Hispanic in a high level White House position. (Later, Republicans would also appoint the first Hispanic to the cabinet -- Dr. Lauro Cavazos -- as Secretary of Education.)

The Republican National Committee maintains on staff a fulltime Hispanic liaison who meets with Hispanic groups and garners their support and confidence. The Democratic National Committee to date, has no similar position or person on staff. Through the Republican National Committee, a handbook was distributed before the 1986 congressional elections to key GOP strategists entitled "Outreach to the Hispanic Community". Included in the handbook was a demographic breakdown of the nine Hispanic states and their congressional districts, Hispanic office holders nationwide and currently operating national Hispanic organizations and groups. This effort combined with direct mail appeals and voter drives were an attempt by the national Republican organizations to bring Hispanics into the Republican party.

The Republican National Committee conducted "get out the vote" efforts in several selected "key" states which had

close Senatorial elections. These states included Texas, Florida and California. The Republican National Committee considered Hispanics an untapped resource in these states, the "sleeping giants" that would hopefully allow the Republicans to maintain control of the United States Senate.

The GOP appealed to Hispanic voters with campaign messages in their native language of Spanish. "The GOP has carefully targeted the most successful immigrant groups, appealing to many with flyers and literature printed in their native languages and often with a heavy dose of flag-waving, anti-communist rhetoric that appeals to many new citizens." (Mintz,1984,A-14)

A large percentage of Hispanics are not registered to vote. Although the vast majority are legal citizens, they are hesitant to register to vote fearing repercussions from immigration authorities. Recent census reports (1985) estimated that 64 percent of the Hispanic population is over eighteen years old -- millions of potential votes for the national parties. The GOP recognized these potential votes and developed massive voter drives in 1986 which registered Hispanics from shopping centers to one voter registration drive in a Florida football stadium. This target voter registration drive proved successful in Florida when Republican Bob Martinez was elected governor.

Newspapers, television and radio were found by GOP researchers to be the primary sources by which voters were introduced and learned the opinions of candidates. The

Republicans concentrated efforts in 1986 on the difficult task of reaching Hispanic voters. A necessary and sometimes difficult medium, the Republican National Committee knew that television was often the primary source for political information by voters. The Midwest Voter Registration Education Project (MVREP), a Hispanic voter education group, found in a survey of the 1987 Chicago primary, 48.6 percent of Hispanics in the Chicago area stated that television was the primary source of their political information. (Midwest Voter Registration Education Project, 1987) This type of information was invaluable to the GOP who could purchase television air time on Hispanic television stations nationwide.

The GOP recognized in order to gain the support and allegiance of Hispanics, they had to reach them in their native language of Spanish. A Hispanic advertising agency quoted in Advertising Age said, "'This is a sensitive market. If you do an obvious translation, the people think you didn't care enough about them to spend the extra dollar.'" (Republican National Committee, 1986) The Republican National Committee Radio Services division employs a full-time bilingual Hispanic employee who records messages for Republican candidates in Spanish which are aired on local Spanish radio stations. Weekly and biweekly actualities are also produced for Spanish radio promoting GOP candidates.



The Computer Systems division in the Republican National Committee also can target Hispanic voters. State parties, GOP candidates and other Republican operatives can obtain ethnic surname identification tapes from the Republican National Committee. These lists can be narrowed according to voter lists, congressional districts or other types of contact lists. This was an invaluable tool in reaching out to the Hispanic community in the Achievement '86 initiative. Brochures, donor solicitation letters and candidate appeal letters were sent to selected Hispanic voter lists -- all written in Spanish.

In Texas, the Republican National Committee and the Republican National Hispanic Assembly (RNHA), in cooperation with the Texas state party sponsored a regional Hispanic leadership conference in Texas in preparation for the 1984 presidential elections.

Hispanic leaders from the states of Arkansas, New Mexico, Texas, Oklahoma and Kansas, convened for a series of workshops on campaign management and basic party building activities. This leadership conference also provided an excellent opportunity for media coverage. The workshops were open to both the Hispanic and Anglo press, and one-on-one interviews were scheduled for party leaders in attendance.  
(Republican National Committee,5)

## CHAPTER IV

### TEXAS VOTING PATTERNS

A brief look at the state houses shows the GOP made some inroads into Texas. There is no dramatic shift of seats, but rather a steady increase (See Table 3). Both Houses showed a small, but steady increase. In 1966, the GOP held only one seat in the Senate and three in the House. Eighteen years later, the number of Republican seats had climbed to six in the Senate, which increased their representation to 19.4 percent. Fifty-three seats in the House gave the GOP 35.3 percent of the seats. Although there is no major jump, some small inroads were made by the GOP into the Texas populace. One could also say the only place the GOP had to go was up. Whether this represented an inroad into the Hispanic population of Texas was another question.

The House in 1966 only had three Republicans. In less than twenty years, the Republicans increased their numbers to fifty-three, almost eighteen times their original number in 1966. In 1966 when the GOP had only a nominal voice, they had strengthened their representation to over one-third of the legislative body in twenty years. This does not show that Hispanics specifically were turning to the GOP; rather

it showed that the state as a whole was generally "realigning" with the Republican party -- an important point to remember. A comparison between Hispanic and non-Hispanic populated areas of Texas and the voting returns was drawn to see if Hispanics specifically were switching their allegiance. If the state was realigning, it was necessary to divide the Hispanic population from the rest of the state to see if Hispanics were identifying with the Republican party at a greater rate. Since no data was available on the Hispanic vote, other measurement tools were devised which incorporated the use of census data and voting returns with a breakdown by county in high (over 50 percent of the population) and low (fewer than 1.5 percent of the population) Hispanic areas of Texas.

Examination of the Hispanic population in the two hundred fifty-four counties of Texas found twenty-six with a high concentration of Hispanic voters and twenty-six with a low concentration. Map 1 shows the highest concentration of Hispanics found in Texas are predominantly along the southern tip of the state, along the Rio Grande River and the western tip of the state which shares the Mexican border. "High" was defined as above 50 percent Hispanic concentration. This was subsequently broken down into areas with over 70 percent Hispanic residents and 50 to 70 percent Hispanic populated counties. "Low" was defined as fewer than 1.5 percent Hispanic residents in the general population of the county. (Approximately one quarter of all

the counties in Texas are fewer than 5 percent Hispanic populated.) By using contrasts of this magnitude, this helped reduce errors in inferring individual behavior from categorical association. (Rogers and Rhyne, 1987) Tables 4 and 6 reveal areas with high Hispanic populations. Areas in Texas with over 70 percent of the population that are Hispanic are found in Table 4. Areas with 50 to 70 percent Hispanic population are found in Table 6.

These densely Hispanic areas were used to compare the results of presidential elections. The general population of the county, as well as the percentage of the county population that is Hispanic, are shown in tables 4 and 6. The average percentage of change from 1960 to 1984 for counties having over 70 percent Hispanic population was an increase of 4.7 percent and from 1976 to 1984 they increased 9.0 percent (See Table 5). There were four counties that had a negative percentage change from 1960 to 1984, and only one county in the 1976 to 1984 comparison. Starr County, which had the highest concentration of Hispanic residents in Texas (96.9 percent), showed the second greatest increase from 6.5 percent to 24.7 percent -- an 18.2 percentage point difference. Webb county which had the second largest Hispanic population (91.5 percent) showed the largest increase with a 25.9 percentage point difference (See Table 5).

Table 7 shows all eleven counties with Hispanic populations from 50 to 70 percent had an increase in

Republican vote from 1976 to 1984 except for Reeves County, which dropped .2 percent from 1980 to 1984. Five counties showed a steady increase. Overall, combining the shifts in the two elections and comparing 1976 with 1984, only one county (Zavala) of the twenty-five counties with a high Hispanic population failed to show a swing toward the Republicans. This overall pattern shows the GOP had some success in its campaign among Mexican Americans. However, these tables show that from 1980 to 1984 when the Republicans were making a direct appeal to the Hispanic vote, the majority of counties with over 50 percent Hispanic residents stayed Democratic. These numbers indicate the GOP had some success in its campaign among Hispanics. Whether this phenomenon is exclusive to Hispanics or whether this is a general national trend of voting for the GOP is not definite.

Table 5 shows the greatest percentage change in counties with 70 percent or more Hispanics occurred in a comparison of the 1976 and 1984 elections -- an increase of 9.0 percent. The average change from 1980 to 1984 was nearly one-third of what it was from 1976 to 1984. Table 7 which displays counties with fewer Hispanics (50 to 70 percent) than Table 5, showed a greater average increase in elections. Once again, 1976 to 1984 was the largest percentage change with a 13.3 percent increase. The counties with fewer Hispanics showed a greater percentage increase than areas with a large number of Hispanics, which

would lead to the conclusion that the entire state, not just Hispanics were leaning towards the GOP.


Table 8 shows the counties in Texas having a low percentage of Hispanic population (1.5 percent or less). There was a steady increase in all twenty-six counties between 1976 to 1984 for the presidential elections. Thirty-five percent (seven of twenty) of these counties steadily increased from 1960. All showed an overall increase between 1960 and 1984. These data combined with the previous tables indicate once again that the GOP has made inroads with the general population and not exclusively with the Hispanic population. Table 9 confirms this thought, especially when compared to the high Hispanic areas -- see Tables 5 and 7.

The next analysis investigated the proportion of Republican votes between 1960 and 1984 for the twenty most populous counties in Texas (See Table 10). Nine had a steady increase in the GOP percentage of the vote. Over half had an increase, but not steady. Only one county with a considerable number of Hispanics, El Paso, had a steady increase. The other counties were more staggered and on the whole did not show as dramatic an increase as the less Hispanic populated counties.

Map 2 shows the GOP percentage of the vote in the 1976 Presidential elections. The Democrats won the majority of the state of Texas, with their principal area of weakness being several major metropolitan areas including two of the

MAP 2

PERCENTAGE OF REPUBLICAN VOTE IN 1976  
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION



largest, Houston and Dallas-Ft. Worth. Outside of these areas, the Republican Party gained only a few other successes, most notably in the northern farming area and the south-central area of the Permian basin and ranch country. (Rogers and Rhyne,1987)


Only in this latter area did the Democrats lose many counties with at least 25 percent Hispanic population and in only one case, Uvalde, did they lose a county with a high population of Hispanics. Furthermore, as Table 4 shows, the Democrats won the fifteen most Hispanic counties with a strong plurality.

Map 3 shows eight years later, Reagan's 1984 landslide victory, and shows the Republicans carried all but twenty of the state's two hundred fifty-four counties and received 63.8 percent of the two-party vote. The Democrats, however, won most of the counties having large Hispanic populations. Map 1 shows the region along the Rio Grande River where the majority of Hispanics are located and Map 3 shows a similar area dominated by the Democrats. The Republicans were more successful in the areas containing 50 to 75 percent Hispanic residents, although this percentage was below the state's figure in all but one county (Uvalde). Of the two hundred twenty-nine counties with populations fewer than 50 percent Hispanic, the Democrats carried only six counties compared to the fifteen counties they won with Hispanic majorities (over 50 percent). (Rogers and Rhyne,1987)



MAP 3

PERCENTAGE OF REPUBLICAN VOTE IN 1984  
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION



Even when carrying the whole state in the 1984 Presidential election by nearly a two to one margin, the Republicans were doing considerably less well with the predominantly Hispanic areas.

An analysis of the pattern of voting among Hispanics or shift in the 1976 to 1980 and 1980 to 1984 elections gave a better indication of GOP inroads.

If a political party is attempting to improve its position among a voting population it has historically been weak in, to measure its possible progress only by whether it wins areas dominated by those voters is probably too severe a standard.  
(Rogers and Rhyne, 1987)

Given the low Republican proportion of votes in heavily Hispanic Texas areas, significant gains could be made by the GOP after 1976 despite the fact that many of these areas remained in the Democratic column.

Upon closer inspection, the shifts found in Tables 4 through 7 show that most of the counties shifted toward the Republican Party with less than the statewide shifts of 8.8 percentage points in 1980 and 6.6 percentage points in 1984. Even though they started from a lower base of Republican support, the majority of counties in these tables did not move as many percentage points toward the GOP as did the state. In contrast, among the twenty-six counties having 1.5 percent or fewer Hispanics, sixteen in 1980 and all but one in 1984, increased their Republican percentage from the

previous presidential election greater than did the state as a whole (See Tables 8 and 9). (Rogers and Rhyne, 1987)


Maps 4 and 5 confirmed this pattern for the whole state. These maps show counties categorized by the number of percentage points each swung toward the Republicans in the election periods of 1976 to 1980 and 1980 to 1984. Over half of Texas moved at least 8 percentage points toward the GOP in both periods. Secondly, no Hispanic majority county had equally large gains in both elections. Only three counties in the rest of Texas; Gillespie, Jefferson and Orange, failed to move at least 8 percentage points toward the GOP in at least one election.

Turning from presidential to congressional elections, Table 12 shows congressional elections which are more regionally based. Elections for the House of Representatives from 1974 to 1986 in the twenty-seven congressional districts of Texas are shown on Table 12. 1960 was included because this was the year that the GOP first noted the impact of the Hispanic vote. It was included as a primary factor in the GOP analysis to explain the defeat of Richard M. Nixon (R) by John F. Kennedy (D) for the presidency in 1960. In that year, the Republicans only had five candidates out of a possible twenty-seven for House seats. Of those five, none have had a steady increase in attracting votes since 1974. Only one, the first congressional district (CD 1), had an increase since 1980. Only two districts consistently have had Republican



## MAP 5

THE PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN REPUBLICAN VOTE  
FOR THE 1980 AND 1984 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS





candidates -- neither of which had shown a steady increase in the GOP vote. Congressional District 7 showed a steady increase since 1980, but it had continually high support for the GOP candidate since 1974. Thus, once again, there is no consistency in the findings.

The two congressional districts in which there had been a consistent GOP candidate were neither high nor low in Hispanic population, hence not a reliable indicator to measure the growth in support of the Republican party among the Hispanic population in Texas. If a party (GOP) cannot field a candidate for national office, one must assume either 1) the Democratic candidate is so strong that it is not worth throwing a name into the hat to help build name identification or 2) there is no local party structure. The national party advocates placing a "sacrificial lamb" on the ballot so at least to get a Republican name out to the public for future elections and also to increase the visibility of the party. These data indicated a breakdown in carrying out this national policy.

Table 13 shows, by a county-by-county, analysis the percentage of vote gained by the Republican party in the four congressional districts which contained high Hispanic populations (15,21,23,27). Table 14 shows four congressional districts which had low Hispanic populations (1,2,6,13).

In the high Hispanic areas, the 23rd Congressional District showed a consistent increase in the Republican vote

from 1978 to 1982 (See Table 13). The Republicans had not offered a candidate since 1982. It is interesting to note that Hispanics comprised 51 percent of the 23rd Congressional District population (Republican National Committee, 1986) and that the Democrats ran a Hispanic -- Albert Bustamante. (Bustamante was recently elected to head the Congressional Hispanic Caucus.)

The 15th Congressional District also had a Hispanic Congressman -- Kika de la Garza -- who has had no Republican challenger since 1980. Even then, the GOP did not gain over 50 percent of the vote in any of the respective counties (See Table 13).

The 27th Congressional District is again represented by a Hispanic Democratic Congressman -- Solomon Ortiz. Of the five counties in the 27th Congressional District, two decreased in the percentage of GOP vote and three gained only relatively few percentage points.

The last Congressional District in the heavily Hispanic area is the 21st held by a Republican, Lamar Smith who gained the seat in 1986. This district had odd results due to the fact that its dividing congressional lines separate many of the county vote tallies so a true analysis could not be drawn. Out of twenty-four counties in the 21st Congressional District, all but five of these had a decrease in the percentage of Republican vote.

In low Hispanic populated congressional districts, the 1st Congressional District is currently held by Jim Chapman,

a Democrat, who had been unopposed since 1980. His last challenger was in 1978 when the GOP received approximately 20 percent of the vote. The highest percentage received by a GOP candidate was 35.9 percent in Rusk County.

The 2nd Congressional District is held by a Democrat - Charles Wilson. Hardin County was the only county to increase its percentage of the GOP vote steadily peaking at 78.5 percent in 1986. Three counties, Anderson, Liberty and Walker, showed an increase from 1978 on, but still were not reaching a majority.

The 6th Congressional District is held by Republican Joe Barton who squeaked a victory over Pete Geren with a 54.9 percent to 45.1 percent victory. Only one county showed a steady increase in this congressional district, Grimes. All counties showed a steady increase in support of the GOP from 1978 to 1986, but the numbers showed this was not a Republican stronghold (See Table 14).

The 13th Congressional District held by Beau Boulter, a Republican, since 1978 has had no steady increase in GOP support with the exception of Randall County in 1980. In 1986, Randall County recorded the highest GOP percentage.

This data indicated that the GOP had made gains among Hispanic Americans in Texas. The 1980 and 1984 elections showed declines in the majorities won by the Democrats in the counties near the Rio Grande River where the majority of Hispanics are concentrated. While these gains were small, they were indeed gains. However, the Republican gains in



the high Hispanic areas were below the gains achieved in other parts of the state. Thus, while the GOP vote increased among Hispanic concentrated areas in Texas, it did not increase as much as it did in other parts of the state. These gains could be attributed to the coattails of Ronald Reagan, and not to GOP efforts to reach Hispanic voters.

Two important points need to be made. First, Republicans have won the White House for the past two elections but have not been able to gain any real strength in the legislature. The majority of states, including Texas, supported Republican Presidential candidates, but have supported Democratic candidates for state and congressional races. The data compiled here support this previous generalization. The national Republican party which had been making a concerted effort to strengthen its numbers in state and congressional seats, were not able to break the virtual hold the Democrats had on these legislative houses. Secondly, incumbents always have the advantage in an election and it is hard to measure this factor. Several issues enter the analysis from congressional franking privileges (Congressmen are allowed to mail out letters and other "official" correspondence for free) to gain greater name identification throughout the district and state. These factors have always made it hard for challengers to unseat incumbents.

## **CHAPTER V**

### **CONCLUSION**

The Republican Party has in recent years, expended a greater effort to attract Hispanic voters. This can clearly be seen by their direct mail efforts, voter programs, media buys in Hispanic areas and a Hispanic liaison in both the White House and the Republican National Committee. There was, however, no confirming evidence by the numbers documented in this study that the GOP made a clear, substantial improvement in gaining Republican identification, votes or even a change (realignment) among Hispanic voters within the state of Texas. Small, but measurable gains, among Hispanic Americans were achieved by the Republicans in Texas from 1976 to 1984. In the high Hispanic populated counties, Republican gains in the presidential vote over the eight year period were primarily in the range of five to twelve percentage points, compared to the overall shift in the state of 15.4 percentage points. The majority of Texas counties, those with fewer than 25 percent Hispanic populations and not in SMSA's, found Republican increases significantly higher. For instance, in the northern part of the state, non-urban counties were moving an average of twenty points or more towards the GOP

with several making shifts of thirty points.

The fortunes of a political party are never guaranteed. There is nothing to indicate that the Democrats will not gain seats in future elections or that an impeachment of the Republican President as occurred with Nixon will lend an extenuating circumstance to the political atmosphere to make voters swing one way. I attempted to see if inroads were being made by Republicans within the Hispanic voting populace -- if as a voting group Hispanics were starting to realign with the GOP. Obviously, much more data needs to be gathered on this topic to see if realignment is occurring within the Hispanic group, the state of Texas or the nation as a whole.

It is my assertion however, that the results of the 1988 Presidential election should be measured before wagering a final convincing statement. It does not have Ronald Reagan leading the conservative cause at the head of the ticket, nor will it be floundering in the aftermath of Watergate. As in any election, there are extenuating circumstances that lead to the election or defeat of a candidate, but 1988 should deliver a clearer picture to the question of Hispanic realignment.

There are nine states in which Hispanics are found to be heavily concentrated. The findings of this study may be used to make generalized assertions about Hispanics to these nine states, but they cannot be generalized to the entire nation. This is because there are no other high

concentrations of Hispanics in the other forty-one states and Hispanics have not been "targeted" for specific ethnic appeals by the GOP. Nor, have Hispanics in other parts of the country been exposed for the most part to advertising, i.e. radio or newspaper, which is specifically aimed at Hispanics as a voter group. Also, enclaves of particular ethnic people behave differently than ethnic individuals scattered throughout a diverse population. Enclaves permit greater adherence to traditional living patterns as well as to doctrine. In the case of Hispanics, enclaves tend to foster greater censorship of ideas as well as adherence to traditional culture.

I speculate the reasons why there has been no marked change in the tendency of Hispanics to vote Republican is twofold. First, Hispanics are ideologically closer to the Republican Party than they are to the Democratic Party. Specifically, Hispanics tend to support positions of anti-abortion, anti-communism, strong law and order and traditional family values which Republicans have tended to focus attention on in campaigns. The Republicans have tried to appeal to these Hispanic values in direct mail efforts and media blitzes. Hispanics, however, have identified with the Democratic party for a period of time and are hesitant to change their party allegiance. A strong family unit is important to the Hispanic culture. It is considered disrespectful to disagree with your elders which includes voting for a particular party or candidate opposite from

your parents. There is also a fear that the Republican party once secure in knowing they have the Hispanic vote will ignore the concerns of Hispanics as Democrats have presumably done. False campaign promises made by candidates to garner the votes of Hispanics will be left unfulfilled.

In a more settled political landscape where minority ties have solidified and the differential policies of the parties have come to dovetail with the socioeconomic wishes and needs of various minority groups, simply 'knocking on doors and being nice' is not enough. For shifts to occur under these conditions, the fundamental position of either of the parties or the minority groups will have to change. That is, the party must adapt new policies or the minority's status must rise or otherwise be altered. Neither have happened significantly in Texas between 1976 and 1984.

(Rogers and Rhyne, 1987)

A second reason for no marked change in Hispanic voting patterns lies within a shortcoming of this study. This study used as a measure the Hispanic population within the state of Texas and the aggregate number of votes. It did not measure or note the Voting Age Population (VAP) which is an important factor to consider. If there are, as suggested, a high percentage of young Hispanics not registered, a true test would be to measure this group to see if 1) a large number of Hispanics have registered and 2) the percentage difference in those who registered Republican over Democratic is higher than the state percentage of all new voters. This percentage could also be analyzed against voting returns to see if a change is occurring. Such a

study would be hard to conduct not to mention the probable high cost involved. Due to the limited amount of resources available to me, I have used what data there were available.

There were several other factors of notable interest to Texas. First, the Democrats fielded strong congressional "teams". Jim Wright, Speaker of the House, and J.J. Pickle, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, would be hard to unseat. The Democrats have also run four Hispanic candidates in heavily Hispanic areas of Texas. In the 15th Congressional District which had a Hispanic population of 66 percent, Kika de la Garza (D) holds the seat. Henry Gonzalez represents the 20th Congressional District which had a 56 percent Hispanic population and Albert Bustamante represents the 23rd Congressional District which had a 51 percent Hispanic population. Lastly, there is Solomon Ortiz who occupies the 27th Congressional District of the House of Representatives seat. The Hispanic population of the 27th is 55 percent of the total congressional district. Hispanics, like blacks, have a strong tendency to vote for someone of their own race. They feel that regardless of the record of the legislator or any allegations of impropriety (this is not to say that any of the above mentioned have been listed in any of these categories) that it is important to have a Hispanic because they feel represented and believe that the Congressman will listen and be able to understand their concerns.

The Republicans are making inroads through all of the counties in Texas, not just those having high Hispanic areas. This can clearly be seen by the increase in the Republican percentage of the vote across elections from 1960 to 1986. Nationally, the GOP had done better in these elections, particularly in the South. In 1984, Ronald Reagan swept forty-nine of the fifty states for a landslide victory never before matched in the history of American voting. In 1986, a year in which the party of the White House is supposed to lose seats in both houses of Congress, the Republicans gained seats in the House of Representatives, where they would normally lose seats. Republicans did however, forfeit the Senate to the Democrats by a large margin. This is why I think it is important to look at the 1988 elections. They gained House seats in 1986 which was unprecedented. This could indicate either a fluke election or the Republicans are making inroads into the national populace.

Another point to note is the enactment of the Immigration Reform Act in 1986. Many immigrants who before were afraid to vote for fear of being sent back to their native country, may now register and vote. This may have a significant impact on the voting results in 1988 and 1990.

Lastly, substantial changes in categories do not occur unless there is a change in basic issues. The GOP issues are not yet popular with Hispanics. The Democrats and the Republicans are both searching for "new themes" to campaign

on in 1988. If the GOP truly wants to gain the Hispanic vote, they must look at recent polls and use this information to "reach out". For instance, one of the primary concerns of Hispanics is the high illiteracy rate among their ethnic group. Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) was involved in the 100th Congress with an effort by the Hispanic community to help increase the literacy rate among Hispanics. Students came to Washington, D.C. during Hispanic Heritage Week and attended seminars on tutoring and leadership so they could return to their communities and help tutor other Hispanics. Efforts such as this will help gain the support and trust of Hispanics for Republican candidates.

As with any study, there are often serendipitous findings, which held true in this study. A pattern of Republican strength in the pre-Reagan era was limited mainly to the larger urban areas of the state. As noted earlier, only two relatively small non-metropolitan areas of the state had Republican majorities (See Map 2). Further, three of the four congressional seats held by the GOP going into the 1980 race were in urbanized areas -- Dallas and Houston. Like much of the south, the GOP gained its earlier strength in Texas in metropolitan areas, especially the suburban ones. The Democratic leanings in local and national elections seemed to be retained in rural areas a bit longer than urban. Also, many of the more populous areas of Texas and nearby suburban rings showed lesser moves toward the GOP



in 1980 and 1984. In 1980, only four of the twenty most populous counties showed an above average shift toward the Republicans, in 1984 the comparable number was seven out of twenty. (Rogers and Rhyne,1987)

The second surprise finding was the location of the area of greatest swing toward the Republicans in 1980. Centered around Lubbock which voted for Gerald R. Ford (R) in 1976, it was below the average percentage point shift of surrounding counties (See Map 4). In contrast, this area found several counties moving only slightly toward the Republicans in 1984 and almost always below the state average. Lubbock was the chief grain area of the state, and one possible reason for the finding was the grain embargo imposed by President Jimmy Carter (D). If this hypothesis is true for the 1980 election swing toward Reagan, it would possibly account for the shift in the same direction in 1984 when farmers were upset with Reagan's farm policy.

Finally, I would like to refer back to Rhyne (1983) whose analysis of the Virginia election and the black vote finds a place here.

In the first place, the findings remind us that old ideas may be old-hat, even banal, but if they make an important point they must not be forgotten. From the dawn of political sociology as a distinct specialty in sociology (Lazarsfeld et al,1948) we have drawn the idea that cross-pressured voters are not the material for winning elections. One can never be sure which of the several status appeals a candidate makes will remain uppermost, and there is certainly no a priori reason to suspect that a voter will only remember the positive appeal and forget

the opposite or negative ones. Second, from the purely pragmatic point of view, if a politician wishes to garner a plurality of votes by way of status-group appeals, he would be well advised to search for combinations that occur together. While superimposition of groups, to use Dahrendorf's term (1959), does increase commitment, it is of little use if the superimposed groups that results are small in numbers. (Rhyne, 17-18)

In answering my initial research questions, documented by my analysis here, there is not a shift from the Democratic to the Republican Party by Hispanic Americans. A slight shift is perhaps occurring, but further analysis needs to be done before documented as a shift. There is no realignment occurring at this point in time, neither are Hispanics shifting their allegiance to the Republican Party except by perhaps a very small percentage.

In answering the last of my initial research questions, I believe there is a willingness to listen to the Republican message. Although there is a willingness to listen, there is also the fear that these are only false promises.

## TABLES

**TABLE 1**

**THE NINE MOST HISPANIC POPULOUS STATES**

1980 CENSUS

<u>STATE</u>	<u>TOTAL/1,000</u>	<u>Population 18 YRS+/1,000</u>	<u>PERCENT OF TOTAL</u>
NEW YORK	1,659	1,062	9.5
ILLINOIS	636	379	5.6
NEW MEXICO	477	293	36.6
CALIFORNIA	4,544	2,775	19.2
ARIZONA	441	257	16.2
FLORIDA	858	629	8.8
<b>TEXAS</b>	<b>2,986</b>	<b>1,757</b>	<b>21.0</b>
COLORADO	340	204	11.8
NEW JERSEY	492	307	6.7

**TABLE 2**

**HISPANIC SUBGROUPS IN SELECTED STATES**

1980 CENSUS				
<u>STATE</u>	<u>MEXICAN</u>	<u>PUERTO RICAN</u>	<u>CUBAN</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
NEW YORK	---	986,389	76,942	557,214
ILLINOIS	408,325	129,165	---	---
NEW MEXICO	233,772	---	---	241,235
CALIFORNIA	3,637,466	93,038	61,004	752,823
ARIZONA	396,410	---	---	---
FLORIDA	---	94,775	470,250	213,741
TEXAS	2,752,487	---	---	196,275
COLORADO	207,204	---	---	---
NEW JERSEY	---	243,540	80,860	---

**TABLE 3**

**TEXAS STATE LEGISLATURE: 1966 - 1984**

	SENATE (31)				HOUSE (150)			
	<u>DEM</u>	<u>REP</u>	<u>REP%</u>	<u>NET REP</u>	<u>DEM</u>	<u>REP</u>	<u>REP%</u>	<u>NET REP</u>
1966	30	1	3.2	+1	147	3	2.0	+2
1968	29	2	6.6	+1	142	8	5.3	+5
1970	29	2	6.5	0	140	10	6.7	+2
1972	28	3	9.7	+1	131	19	12.7	+9
1974	28	3	9.7	0	134	16	10.7	-3
1976	27	4	12.9	+1	131	19	12.7	+3
1978	26	5	16.1	+1	127	23	15.3	+4
1980	24	7	22.6	+2	112	38	25.3	+15
1982	26	5	16.1	-2	114	36	24.0	-2
1984	25	6	19.4	+1	97	53	35.3	+17

NOTE: REP% is the percentage of seats held by the  
Republicans for that legislature.

NET REP is the number of seats gained by the  
Republicans from the previous election.

**TABLE 4**

**TEXAS COUNTIES WITH OVER 70% HISPANIC POPULATION**

PERCENTAGE OF REPUBLICAN VOTE IN  
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

<u>COUNTY</u>	<u>1980 POP</u>	<u>%HISP</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>Election Year</u>		
				<u>1976</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1984</u>
BROOKS	8,428	86.0	22.6	18.7	23.4	24.9
CAMERON	209,680	77.1	45.0	39.1	47.6	52.8
DIMMIT	11,367	77.8	42.2	33.9	35.3	34.4
DUVAL	12,517	85.8	17.5	13.4	21.3	24.3
HIDALGO	283,229	81.3	42.1	35.2	41.8	44.4
JIM HOGG	5,168	90.5	15.1	20.7	26.8	26.3
KENEDY	543	82.9	48.7	31.7	40.6	46.6
LA SALLE	5,514	73.7	31.2	34.1	34.4	40.1
MAVERICK	31,398	90.3	29.9	24.3	31.4	36.8
PRESIDIO	5,188	76.9	30.1	35.5	40.2	45.8
STARR	27,266	96.9	6.5	12.5	22.2	24.7
WEBB	99,258	91.5	15.2	28.7	30.8	41.1
WILLACY	17,495	80.3	39.2	33.8	39.1	43.5
ZAPATA	6,628	76.1	27.8	27.5	41.0	43.5
ZAVALA	11,666	89.0	51.6	28.5	23.5	23.9

NOTE: 1980 POP is the 1980 census population for that county.

%HISP is the percentage of the county population which is of Hispanic origin.

**TABLE 5**

**TEXAS COUNTIES WITH OVER 70% HISPANIC POPULATION**

**PERCENTAGE OF CHANGE IN REPUBLICAN VOTE  
IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS**

<u>COUNTY</u>	Election Year		
	<u>1960-1984</u>	<u>1976-1984</u>	<u>1980-1984</u>
BROOKS	+2.3	+6.2	+1.5
CAMERON	+7.8	+13.7	+5.2
DIMMIT	-7.8	+0.5	-0.9
DUVAL	+6.8	+10.9	+3.0
HIDALGO	+2.2	+9.1	+2.5
JIM HOGG	+11.2	+5.6	-0.5
KENEDY	-2.1	+14.9	+6.0
LA SALLE	-8.9	+6.0	+5.7
MAVERICK	+6.9	+12.5	+5.4
PRESIDIO	+15.7	+10.3	+5.6
STARR	+18.2	+12.2	+2.5
WEBB	+25.9	+12.4	+10.3
WILLACY	+4.3	+9.7	+4.4
ZAPATA	+15.7	+16.0	+2.5
ZAVALA	-27.7	-4.6	+0.4
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE CHANGE:	+4.7	+9.0	+3.6



**TABLE 6**

**TEXAS COUNTIES WITH 50-70% HISPANIC POPULATION**

PERCENTAGE OF REPUBLICAN VOTE IN  
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

<u>COUNTY</u>	<u>1980 POP</u>	<u>%HISP</u>	<u>Election Year</u>			
			<u>1960</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1984</u>
BEXAR*	988,800	46.6	45.6	44.6	51.7	59.8
CULBERSON	3,315	63.4	46.2	47.4	55.4	55.6
EL PASO	479,899	61.9	45.2	47.7	53.5	56.0
FRIO	13,785	68.4	39.8	32.8	37.6	43.0
HUDSPETH	2,728	58.2	39.0	44.8	53.3	60.6
JIM WELLS	36,498	67.2	34.2	30.7	38.3	43.1
KINNEY	2,279	57.5	37.1	37.7	51.9	61.4
KLEBERG	33,358	52.2	35.7	39.1	45.8	53.7
REEVES	15,801	62.0	40.5	39.4	50.9	50.7
UVALDE	22,441	55.2	62.3	56.9	61.1	65.9
VAL VERDE	35,910	62.9	43.0	42.6	54.0	60.5

NOTE: 1980 POP is the 1980 census population for that county.

%HISP is the percentage of the county population which is of Hispanic origin.

\*Bexar was included because it has the third largest population in the state, thus numerically Hispanics comprise a large number.

**TABLE 7**

**TEXAS COUNTIES WITH 50-70% HISPANIC POPULATION**

**PERCENTAGE OF CHANGE IN REPUBLICAN VOTE  
IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS**

<u>COUNTY</u>	Election Year		
	<u>1960-1984</u>	<u>1976-1984</u>	<u>1980-1984</u>
BEXAR	+14.2	+15.2	+8.1
CULBERSON	+ 9.4	+8.2	+0.2
EL PASO	+10.8	+8.3	+2.5
FRIO	+3.2	+10.2	+5.4
HUDSPETH	+21.6	+15.8	+7.3
JIM WELLS	+ 8.9	+12.4	+4.8
KINNEY	+24.3	+23.7	+9.5
KLEBERG	+18.0	+14.6	+7.9
REEVES	+10.2	+11.3	-0.2
UVALDE	+3.6	+9.0	+4.8
VAL VERDE	+17.5	+17.9	+6.5
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE CHANGE:	+12.9	+13.3	+5.2

TABLE 8

## TEXAS COUNTIES WITH FEWER THAN 1.5% HISPANIC POPULATION

PERCENTAGE OF REPUBLICAN VOTE IN  
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

COUNTY	1980 POP	%HISP	Election Year			
			1960	1976	1980	1984
BOWIE	75,301	1.3	39.0	43.2	54.4	64.4
CAMP	9,275	1.3	39.7	34.5	42.3	53.9
CASS	29,430	1.1	43.9	41.8	46.8	56.9
CLAY	9,582	0.9	37.5	31.7	44.4	58.2
DELTA	4,839	0.4	25.1	21.1	35.8	51.3
FANNIN	24,285	1.3	30.0	26.3	37.1	51.6
FRANKLIN	6,893	1.1	34.9	31.5	42.0	62.4
GRAYSON	89,796	1.5	42.4	41.2	53.7	65.6
HARDIN	40,721	1.4	32.8	37.9	44.3	55.3
HARRISON	52,265	1.5	46.4	49.8	53.3	61.9
HENDERSON	42,606	1.5	42.2	36.0	48.5	63.5
JACK	7,408	1.3	55.2	36.5	51.5	65.9
JASPER	30,781	1.2	41.0	36.8	42.9	50.8
LAMAR	42,156	0.9	43.7	34.0	45.2	62.8
MARION	10,360	1.0	43.9	40.8	44.7	52.5
MONTAGUE	17,410	1.4	47.1	34.7	48.6	62.9
NEWTON	13,254	1.8	29.2	22.5	29.3	39.2
RAINS	4,839	1.2	37.1	27.5	40.2	60.3
SABINE	8,702	1.3	33.6	27.4	40.8	51.3
SAN						
AUGUSTINE	8,785	0.9	32.5	36.5	45.2	55.0
SAN						
JACINTO	11,434	1.0	28.5	31.0	41.2	56.3
SHELBY	23,084	1.1	33.6	36.5	44.8	57.4
TRINITY	9,450	0.9	31.2	33.0	36.9	55.1
TYLER	16,223	0.8	52.7	36.9	41.1	53.8
UPSHUR	28,595	0.8	40.7	39.8	49.1	61.4
WOOD	24,697	1.1	46.9	42.6	52.1	67.4

NOTE: 1980 POP is the 1980 census population for that county.

%HISP is the percentage of the county population which is of Hispanic origin.

TABLE 9

## TEXAS COUNTIES WITH FEWER THAN 1.5% HISPANIC POPULATION

PERCENTAGE OF CHANGE IN REPUBLICAN VOTE  
IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

COUNTY	Election Year		
	1960-1984	1976-1984	1980-1984
BOWIE	+25.4	+21.2	+10.0
CAMP	+14.2	+19.4	+11.6
CASS	+13.0	+15.1	+10.1
CLAY	+20.7	+26.5	+13.8
DELTA	+26.2	+30.2	+15.5
FANNIN	+21.6	+25.3	+14.5
FRANKLIN	+27.5	+30.9	+20.4
GRAYSON	+23.2	+24.4	+11.9
HARDIN	+22.5	+17.4	+11.0
HARRISON	+15.5	+12.1	+8.6
HENDERSON	+21.3	+27.5	+15.0
JACK	+10.7	+29.4	+14.4
JASPER	+9.8	+14.0	+7.9
LAMAR	+19.1	+28.0	+17.6
MARION	+8.6	+11.7	+7.8
MONTAGUE	+15.8	+28.2	+14.3
NEWTON	+10.0	+16.7	+9.9
RAINS	+23.2	+32.8	+20.1
SABINE	+17.7	+23.9	+10.5
SAN			
AUGUSTINE	+22.5	+18.5	+9.8
SAN			
JACINTO	+27.8	+25.3	+15.1
SHELBY	+23.8	+20.9	+12.6
TRINITY	+23.9	+22.1	+18.2
TYLER	+1.1	+16.9	+12.7
UPSHUR	+20.7	+21.6	+12.3
WOOD	+20.5	+24.8	+15.3
AVERAGE			
PERCENTAGE CHANGE:	+18.7	+22.5	+13.1

**TABLE 10**

**TWENTY MOST POPULOUS COUNTIES IN TEXAS**  
(Rank Ordered 1-20)

PERCENTAGE OF REPUBLICAN VOTE IN  
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

<u>COUNTY</u>	<u>1980 POP</u>	<u>%HISP</u>	<u>Election Year</u>			
			<u>1960</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1984</u>
HARRIS	2,409,547	15.3	51.7	52.2	57.9	61.6
DALLAS	1,556,390	9.9	62.2	56.7	59.2	66.6
BEXAR	988,800	46.6	45.6	44.6	51.7	59.8
TARRANT	860,880	7.9	54.8	50.0	56.9	67.4
EL PASO	479,899	61.9	45.2	47.7	53.5	56.0
TRAVIS	419,573	17.2	44.9	46.7	45.7	57.0
HIDALGO	283,229	81.3	42.1	35.2	41.8	44.3
NUECES	268,215	48.9	39.1	38.0	46.8	53.8
JEFFERSON	250,938	4.1	41.8	40.3	43.5	45.1
LUBBOCK	211,651	19.6	56.4	60.4	68.8	75.3
CAMERON	209,727	77.1	45.0	39.1	47.6	52.8
GALVESTON	195,940	12.0	40.1	39.6	46.6	52.7
MC LENNAN	170,755	8.8	42.5	45.3	53.7	64.5
BRAZORIA	169,587	13.4	50.1	46.7	58.1	67.8
BELL	157,889	11.0	30.1	46.0	54.7	70.0
COLLIN	144,576	5.0	42.2	60.0	67.9	81.8
DENTON	143,126	4.5	51.5	51.5	59.9	75.9
FORT BEND	130,846	20.4	42.8	60.3	66.3	68.8
MONTGOMERY	128,487	3.3	47.7	53.1	65.6	75.6
SMITH	128,366	3.1	57.8	56.6	64.6	27.2

NOTE: 1980 POP is the 1980 census population for that county.

%HISP is the percentage of the county population which is of Hispanic origin.

**TABLE 11**

**TWENTY MOST POPULOUS COUNTIES IN TEXAS**  
(Rank Ordered 1-20)

PERCENTAGE OF CHANGE IN REPUBLICAN VOTE  
IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

<u>COUNTY</u>	Election Years		
	<u>1960-1984</u>	<u>1976-1984</u>	<u>1980-1984</u>
HARRIS	+9.9	+9.4	+3.7
DALLAS	+4.4	+9.9	+7.4
BEXAR	+14.2	+15.2	+8.1
TARRANT	+12.6	+17.4	+10.5
EL PASO	+10.8	+8.3	+2.5
TRAVIS	+12.1	+10.3	+11.3
HIDALGO	+2.2	+9.1	+2.5
NUECES	+14.7	+15.8	+7.0
JEFFERSON	+3.3	+4.8	+1.6
LUBBOCK	+18.9	+14.9	+6.5
CAMERON	+7.8	+13.7	+5.2
GALVESTON	+12.6	+13.1	+6.1
MC LENNAN	+22.0	+19.2	+10.8
BRAZORIA	+17.7	+19.1	+9.7
BELL	+39.9	+24.0	+15.3
COLLIN	+39.6	+21.8	+13.9
BENTON	+24.4	+24.4	+16.0
FORT BEND	+26.0	+8.5	+2.5
MONTGOMERY	+27.9	+22.5	+10.0
SMITH	-30.6	-29.4	-37.4
AVERAGE			
PERCENTAGE CHANGE:	+14.5	+12.6	+5.7

**TABLE 12**

**TEXAS CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS**

**PERCENTAGE OF REPUBLICAN VOTE  
IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS**

<u>CD</u>	<u>Election Year</u>							
	<u>1960</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1986</u>
1.	No R	31.4	16.3	21.9	No R	No R	No R	No R
2.	29.9	No R	No R	29.9	29.5	No R	40.7	40.5
3.	No R	64.7	74.0	100.0	79.3	77.1	83.0	94.1
4.	No R	25.1	37.3	38.5	47.7	25.3	42.0	28.3
5.	57.3	52.1	44.6	49.1	48.8	33.7	No R	40.7
6.	No R	17.0	33.4	34.9	29.1	No R	56.6	55.8
7.	No R	79.2	100.0	85.1	82.1	85.0	86.7	87.4
8.	21.9	27.8	39.2	38.5	51.8	56.7	64.6	68.4
9.	No R	38.1	No R	36.7	No R	30.3	41.2	38.5
10.	No R	19.6	23.2	23.7	38.8	No R	No R	27.7
11.	No R	17.2	42.6	48.4	No R	No R	No R	No R
12.	No R	21.3	23.8	31.5	39.9	30.5	No R	31.3
13.	No R	42.4	40.4	No R	45.0	35.3	53.0	64.9
14.	No R	No R	38.6	27.6	43.2	38.6	51.3	52.3
15.	No R	No R	25.6	33.8	30.0	No R	No R	No R
16.	18.0	No R	42.2	30.0	No R	44.2	42.6	34.3
17.	No R	No R	No R	31.9	No R	No R	No R	No R
18.	No R	14.0	14.0	No R	17.9	14.7	19.0	No R
19.	No R	No R	45.4	46.8	No R	17.3	58.1	62.0
20.	No R	No R	No R	No R	17.3	No R	No R	No R
21.	No R	45.2	26.7	100.0*	76.5	74.6	80.6	60.6
22.	39.2	28.4	49.9	50.6	51.0	100.0	65.3	71.8
23.	No R	No R	No R	No R	30.1	44.2	No R	No R
24.	No R	20.4	36.1	45.9	38.7	26.0	40.5	32.8
25.	No R	No R	No R	No R	No R	37.9	36.0	No R
26.	No R	No R	No R	No R	No R	49.9	51.3	68.1
27.	No R	No R	No R	No R	No R	33.8	36.4	No R

NOTE: CD is the Texas congressional district.

No R indicates there was no Republican candidate for that election.

\*Two Republican candidates ran against each other.

**TABLE 13**

**TEXAS CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS HAVING HIGH HISPANIC  
POPULATIONS**

PERCENTAGE OF REPUBLICAN VOTE  
IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

<u>COUNTY</u>	<u>1978</u>	Election Year			
		<u>1980</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1986</u>
<b>23RD CD</b>					
KINNEY	0.0	31.2	36.8	No R	No R
UVALDE	0.0	32.4	42.6	No R	No R
VAL VERDE	40.7	58.6	50.0	No R	No R
MAVERICK	0.0	12.6	14.6	No R	No R
MEDINA	32.3	47.2	45.1	No R	No R
ZAVALA	0.0	13.4	14.7	No R	No R
DIMMIT	0.0	16.3	20.9	No R	No R
WEBB	0.0	18.5	20.6	No R	No R
<b>15TH CD</b>					
FRIO	0.0	19.6	No R	No R	No R
ATASDOSA	0.0	27.8	No R	No R	No R
LA SALLE	0.0	13.3	No R	No R	No R
WILSON	0.0	27.3	No R	No R	No R
KARNES	12.1	25.0	No R	No R	No R
LIVE OAK	36.2	42.3	No R	No R	No R
MCMULLEN	31.5	35.6	No R	No R	No R
DUVAL	8.1	11.2	No R	No R	No R
JIM WELLS	24.5	24.0	No R	No R	No R
ZAPATA	19.6	23.0	No R	No R	No R
JIM HOGG	7.8	12.2	No R	No R	No R
BROOKS	14.1	11.9	No R	No R	No R
STARR	8.8	9.4	No R	No R	No R
HILDALGO	38.7	32.1	No R	No R	No R
<b>27TH CD</b>					
CAMERON	42.0	35.1	33.3	36.3	No R
WILLACY	31.0	22.7	26.7	28.1	No R
KENEDY	11.5	11.9	13.9	12.9	No R
KLEBERG	27.3	32.0	29.6	37.5	No R
NUECES	32.2	48.2	34.8	36.6	No R

(Continued on next page.)



**TABLE 13**  
(Continued)

**TEXAS CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS HAVING HIGH HISPANIC  
POPULATIONS**

PERCENTAGE OF REPUBLICAN VOTE  
IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

<u>COUNTY</u>	<u>1978</u>	Election Year			
		<u>1980</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1986</u>
<b>21ST CD</b>					
PRESIDIO	13.0	0.0	38.0	0.0	13.0
BREWSTER	46.8	60.7	58.5	65.4	31.8
PECOS	45.3	65.4	63.3	67.4	28.4
TERRELL	52.1	73.1	59.6	63.9	26.7
CROCKETT	50.4	67.8	69.9	69.5	35.5
CRANE	44.9	68.3	63.2	75.4	39.1
UPTON	51.4	71.6	64.9	76.2	35.4
MIDLAND	76.8	0.0	75.2	82.7	55.2
REAGAN	48.2	72.8	67.8	81.1	33.1
IRION	56.3	77.0	67.1	77.6	38.1
TOM GREEN	51.6	74.6	69.1	77.6	44.7
SCHLEICHER	59.1	70.0	65.9	76.2	41.2
SUTTON	53.0	76.2	69.7	76.0	47.8
EDWARDS	65.6	81.3	77.4	83.1	48.8
REAL	48.9	74.1	71.5	78.8	51.7
BANDERA	57.8	79.0	75.7	82.1	64.7
KERR	72.4	82.1	78.6	82.4	65.3
KENDALL	64.3	86.7	84.5	86.6	73.2
GILLESPIE	76.7	87.7	85.1	86.5	68.3
KIMBLE	56.4	72.9	70.4	82.6	46.3
LLANO	53.4	62.5	60.6	68.2	51.4
MASON	73.6	81.6	74.6	78.6	44.1
MCCULLOUGH	39.1	0.0	49.3	64.7	52.7
MENARD	52.7	66.5	59.3	68.8	41.2

NOTE: CD is the Texas congressional district.

No R indicates when there was no Republican candidate for that election.

\*In defining Congressional Districts, counties are sometimes split. A 0.0% vote score usually indicates there was no Republican candidate for the seat; however, the vote tally was merged with another congressional district.

**TABLE 14**

**TEXAS CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS HAVING LOW HISPANIC  
POPULATIONS**

PERCENTAGE OF REPUBLICAN VOTE  
IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

<u>COUNTY</u>	<u>1978</u>	Election Year			
		<u>1980</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1986</u>
<b>1st CD</b>					
LAMAR	18.8	No R	No R	No R	No R
CASS	21.0	No R	No R	No R	No R
RED RIVER	17.3	No R	No R	No R	No R
BOWIE	23.4	No R	No R	No R	No R
HUNT	30.6	No R	No R	No R	No R
DELTA	9.3	No R	No R	No R	No R
HOPKINS	19.9	No R	No R	No R	No R
FRANKLIN	16.2	No R	No R	No R	No R
TITUS	20.0	No R	No R	No R	No R
MORRIS	16.7	No R	No R	No R	No R
CAMP	18.9	No R	No R	No R	No R
UPSHUR	21.8	No R	No R	No R	No R
MARION	13.2	No R	No R	No R	No R
HARRISON	14.5	No R	No R	No R	No R
PANOLA	22.0	No R	No R	No R	No R
RUSK	35.9	No R	No R	No R	No R
HENDERSON	24.9	No R	No R	No R	No R
CHEROKEE	26.4	No R	No R	No R	No R
SHELBY	33.2	No R	No R	No R	No R
SAN AUGUSTINE	19.6	No R	No R	No R	No R
<b>2ND CD</b>					
SABINE	22.8	22.3	No R	37.6	32.6
JASPER	26.0	24.1	No R	36.0	29.7
NEWTON	16.3	15.9	No R	29.4	23.4
ANGELINA	41.5	27.8	No R	38.4	24.3
HOUSTON	24.0	18.6	No R	37.1	28.3
ANDERSON	26.3	31.6	No R	48.4	35.9
POLK	29.1	25.5	No R	46.6	30.9
HARDIN	21.2	21.3	No R	38.8	78.6
LIBERTY	22.9	27.9	No R	40.2	37.9
ORANGE	25.5	24.5	No R	33.4	22.3

(Continued on next page.)

**TABLE 14**  
(Continued)

**TEXAS CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS HAVING LOW HISPANIC  
POPULATIONS**

PERCENTAGE OF REPUBLICAN VOTE  
IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

<u>COUNTY</u>	Election Year				
	<u>1978</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1986</u>
<b>2ND CD</b>					
TRINITY	21.8	17.2	No R	35.8	25.7
WALKER	26.0	30.9	No R	49.2	37.4
SAN JACINTO	25.7	25.4	No R	40.5	31.7
<b>6TH CD</b>					
LEON	24.6	24.2	No R	45.7	46.3
MADISON	28.1	25.8	No R	46.8	44.1
BRAZOS	27.6	22.0	No R	54.8	54.4
GRIMES	24.5	26.4	No R	41.5	41.8
ROBERTSON	12.4	9.6	No R	27.6	35.7
LIMESTONE	18.2	16.1	No R	44.1	43.8
FREESTONE	29.0	28.0	No R	45.6	45.9
NAVARRO	24.2	15.8	No R	47.5	44.2
HILL	22.6	19.1	No R	45.6	48.9
ELLIS	25.1	24.9	No R	57.8	59.1
JOHNSON	30.1	23.9	No R	54.0	55.2
HOOD	46.4	0.0	No R	58.1	54.7
<b>13TH CD</b>					
DALLAM	26.7	49.1	36.4	58.4	61.3
HARTLEY	21.9	49.5	36.0	59.1	60.3
OLDHAM	18.3	40.5	32.9	47.3	65.4
SHERMAN	22.4	58.2	48.4	61.3	69.4
MOORE	27.1	46.6	38.5	58.7	67.6
POTTER	28.6	47.1	38.2	55.7	65.4
RANDALL	32.3	53.8	45.5	65.8	75.7
SWISHER	10.4	23.8	12.7	23.6	33.1
HANSFORD	22.9	48.5	40.6	64.2	75.3
HUTCHINSON	31.8	55.8	49.9	66.7	72.5
CARSON	23.3	44.6	35.7	51.1	61.0
ARMSTRONG	23.3	45.2	34.9	50.7	55.5
BRISCOE	14.3	31.2	17.7	26.3	38.5
FLOYD	26.7	0.0	26.0	39.5	55.2
KENT	22.9	0.0	10.6	22.1	35.2
DICKENS	10.0	14.7	9.2	16.6	32.3

(Continued on next page.)

**TABLE 14**  
(Continued)

**TEXAS CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS HAVING LOW HISPANIC  
POPULATIONS**

PERCENTAGE OF REPUBLICAN VOTE  
IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

<u>COUNTY</u>	Election Year				
	<u>1978</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1986</u>
<b>13TH CD</b>					
MOTLEY	28.5	39.1	25.5	37.6	60.9
HALL	15.7	27.4	16.1	27.0	38.6
DONLEY	22.4	42.0	30.3	49.0	57.7
GRAY	35.2	56.2	49.7	67.0	73.0
ROBERTS	31.5	56.0	49.3	63.2	68.8
OCHILTREE	68.3	55.7	45.2	72.3	82.1
LIPSCOMB	27.9	59.8	46.6	64.8	71.9
HEMPHILL	21.0	46.7	42.1	54.4	65.2
WHEELER	27.4	48.4	38.7	52.6	55.2
COLLINSWORTH	21.3	36.4	22.7	36.5	22.9
CHILDRESS	22.9	38.0	26.4	40.8	52.7
COTTLE	10.0	29.0	13.9	22.8	29.6
KING	12.7	33.5	16.7	22.5	40.3
HARDEMAN	10.9	31.5	22.4	33.3	51.0
FOARD	7.2	22.7	13.3	23.5	41.0
KNOX	15.8	0.0	12.9	23.3	47.9
BAYLOR	20.5	0.0	28.5	38.9	59.1
WILBARGER	12.1	27.5	17.3	29.3	59.7
WICHITA	22.2	39.3	29.7	46.8	64.4
ARCHER	16.1	38.6	32.8	50.7	65.3
CLAY	14.9	31.2	24.8	37.6	58.3

NOTE: CD is the Texas congressional district.

No R indicates when there was no Republican candidate for that election.

\*In defining Congressional Districts counties are sometimes split. A 0.0% vote score usually indicates there was no Republican candidate for the seat; however, the vote tally was merged with another congressional district.

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